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Abstract
This paper calculates an implied cost of equity for 19 developed countries from 1991 to 2006.
During this period, there has been a decline in the cost of equity of about 10-15 bps per year,
which can be partially attributed to declining government yields and declining inﬂation. Analyst
forecast inaccuracy, a proxy for ﬁrm-level earnings opacity, is positively related to the cost of
equity. If this variable captures differences in disclosure across ﬁrms, then improvements in
disclosure regulation may beneﬁt ﬁrms by lowering their cost of equity. I also include country-
level variables that measure disclosure requirements, director liability, and the ability for
shareholders to sue directors. Higher levels of these measures are associated with a lower cost of
equity. Previous studies [e.g., Hail and Leuz (2006a)] have found a similar relation, but my study
is unique in that it uses a different measure of investor protection, which may better reﬂect
regulatory differences across countries, and it shows this relation holds for developed countries.
After controlling for the characteristics of ﬁrms that analysts choose to cover in each country,
differences in the properties of analyst forecasts across countries, and differences in accounting
standards across countries, Canada’s cost of equity is statistically different from a handful of
countries and is about 20 to 40 bps higher than that of the United States. Lowering Canadian
ﬁrms’ cost of equity by this amount would have large economic beneﬁts given the size of
Canada’s capital markets.
JEL classiﬁcation: G30, G38
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial markets; International topics
Résumé
L’auteur calcule le coût implicite des capitaux propres dans 19 pays développés de 1991 à 2006.
Durant cette période, le coût des capitaux propres a diminué d’environ 10 à 15 points de base par
année, en partie sous l’effet de la baisse des rendements sur les obligations d’État et du recul de
l’inﬂation. Les erreurs de prévision des analystes, une variable d’approximation à l’égard de
l’opacité entourant les proﬁts des sociétés, sont en relation positive avec le coût des capitaux
propres. Si cette variable rend bien compte des disparités dans la communication de l’information
ﬁnancière des ﬁrmes, il serait alors possible que l’amélioration de la réglementation en la matière
bénéﬁcie aux entreprises en induisant une réduction du coût des capitaux propres. L’auteur intègre
en outre des variables nationales aﬁn de quantiﬁer les exigences relatives à la communication
ﬁnancière, la responsabilité des conseils d’administration et la latitude des actionnaires à
poursuivre ces derniers. Le coût des capitaux propres est relativement bas lorsque ces variables
sont élevées. Des études antérieures (p. ex., Hail et Leuz, 2006a) avaient établi un lien analogue,iv
mais l’étude de l’auteur se distingue à double titre : elle exploite une mesure différente de la
protection des investisseurs, laquelle révèle peut-être mieux l’écart entre les réglementations
nationales, et elle montre que ce lien vaut pour les pays développés. Une fois que sont prises en
compte les caractéristiques des sociétés que les analystes choisissent de traiter dans chaque pays,
ainsi que les différences entre les propriétés des prévisions formulées d’un pays à l’autre et entre
les normes comptables nationales, il apparaît que le coût des capitaux propres au Canada diffère
statistiquement de celui de certains pays et dépasse de quelque 20 à 40 points de base celui que
supportent les entreprises américaines. Diminuer dans cet ordre de grandeur le coût des capitaux
propres des ﬁrmes canadiennes apporterait des avantages économiques importants vu la taille des
marchés ﬁnanciers au Canada.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G30, G38
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés ﬁnanciers; Questions internationales1 
1.  Introduction 
There has been recent interest in identifying ways to reduce Canadian firms’ cost of equity 
financing, since this would enable them to become more competitive in today’s global capital 
markets and should ultimately increase Canadian economic growth.  For the most part, the focus 
has been on comparing Canadian firms’ cost of equity to that of the United States.
1  However, 
other jurisdictions, like the United Kingdom, have become an attractive destination for foreign 
firms to raise capital, and this could imply the United Kingdom has a lower cost of equity than in 
the United States.  Therefore, in this paper, I calculate the implied cost of equity for non-
financial firms across 19 developed countries to determine the characteristics that affect the cost 
of equity and to provide a broader range of benchmarks for which to compare Canada’s cost of 
equity.   I also identify a set of firm-level and country-level factors that affect the cost of equity. 
I measure the implied cost of equity - the discount rate that equates the discounted value of 
analyst forecasts of firms’ future earnings to the current stock price - using four different 
variations of the dividend discount model.  A handful of previous studies have examined the 
implied cost of equity across developed and developing countries, but their focus is not on 
examining country-level estimates of the cost of equity.  Indeed, very few studies actually 
provide country-level cost of equity estimates.  Instead, these studies find that firms that face 
stronger legal institutions, the enforcement of insider trading, and more extensive disclosure, 
have a lower cost of equity.  However, differences in accounting rules, and in the selection of 
firms that analysts cover, could impact the cost of equity across firms, countries, and time.  This 
study accounts for these latter differences by focusing only on developed countries, where the 
differences in the strength of legal institutions and enforcement are less, and uses more 
independent variables reflecting accounting and analyst forecast differences that may have an 
effect on cost of equity estimates.   
After measuring the implied cost of equity for 19 developed countries from 1991 to 2006, I 
find a decline in the cost of equity of about 15 bps per year on average across these 19 
jurisdictions, which can be mostly attributed to declining government yields and declining 
inflation.  When measuring a real cost of equity, and controlling for this decline in real 
                                                 
1 See, for example, the Capital Markets Leadership Task Force Report (2006), the Task Force to Modernize 
Securities Regulation in Canada (2006), and Witmer and Zorn (2007). 2 
government yields, this rate of decline is much smaller.  There is also a small, positive relation 
between the real cost of equity and real government bond yields, illustrating the impact that 
fiscal and monetary policy may have on the real cost of equity.   
Several variables are shown to be related to the cost of equity.  Most notably, analyst 
forecast inaccuracy, a potential proxy for firm-level earnings opacity, is positively related to the 
cost of equity.  If this variable captures differences in disclosure across firms, then improvements 
in disclosure regulation would benefit firms by lowering their cost of equity.   
After controlling for the characteristics of firms that analysts choose to cover in each 
country, differences in the properties of analyst forecasts across countries, and differences in 
accounting standards across countries, Canada’s cost of equity is statistically different from a 
handful of countries and the magnitudes of these differences are economically significant.  For 
example, in several specifications the cost of equity for the United States is below that of Canada 
by a statistically significant 20 to 40 bps.  Reducing market frictions in Canada and lowering 
Canadian firm’s cost of equity by this amount would have large economic benefits given the size 
of Canada’s capital markets.  
Country-level differences in the cost of equity may be related to country-level factors such 
as securities regulation, enforcement, measurement error, or other variables not controlled for.  
Therefore, in lieu of the country dummy variables, I include country-level measures of disclosure 
requirements, director liability, and the ability for shareholders to sue directors.  Higher levels of 
these measures are associated with a lower cost of equity.  Previous studies [e.g., Hail and Leuz 
(2006a)] have found a similar relation, but my study is unique in that it uses a different measure 
of investor protection, which may better reflect regulatory differences across developed 
countries, and it shows that this relation does in fact hold for developed countries, whereas 
results from previous studies using other variables may have been driven by large differences 
between developed and developing countries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, I briefly review earlier studies 
that have calculated a cost of equity at an international level.  Section 3 describes the dataset 
while Section 4 empirically examines the cost of equity and its drivers for international firms.  I 
explore the robustness of the results in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.  3 
2. International Studies on the Implied Cost of Equity 
Most recent research on international implied cost of equity has concentrated on relating a 
country’s implied cost of equity to country-level institutional variables, such as legal institutions, 
enforcement of insider trading, disclosure, and corporate governance.  These country cost of 
equity estimates are either measured as the median or mean of firm-level cost of equity 
estimates, or are calculated using aggregate stock index data.  
2.1. Cost of Equity Estimates derived from Firm-level Data: 
Hail and Leuz (2006a) estimate a country median of the firm-level cost of equity (measured 
in local currency) using four different models for 40 countries from 1992-2001. After controlling 
for several firm and country factors, they find that countries with weak legal institutions have a 
higher cost of equity than those with stronger institutions.  However, they include both 
developing and developed countries in their sample, and it is plausible to think that the relation 
between the cost of equity and legal institutions is stronger for developing countries.  First, 
developed countries are more integrated with global capital markets, making it easier for firms 
from these countries to opt-in to the regulation of other countries via a cross-listing, so 
differences in a country’s legal institutions would be more likely to have an impact on a firm’s 
cost of equity in developing countries.  Second, the effect of legal institutions on the cost of 
equity may be non-linear, in that the effect of improving very weak legal institutions may be 
stronger than the effect of improving strong legal institutions.  This also would suggest a stronger 
effect in developing countries since developing countries score lower on the measures used by 
Hail and Leuz (2006a).   
Claus and Thomas (2001) also generate country cost of equity estimates using firm-level 
data for a handful of countries.  The purpose of their paper is to show that their implied cost of 
equity methodology may be able to generate lower estimates of equity risk premia, compared 
with equity premia estimates generated from historic returns data.  Their study focuses mostly on 
the United States, but they also provide cost of equity estimates using their methodology for five 
other countries to validate their U.S. results. 
There are two studies on the international implied cost of equity that relate a firm-level cost 
of equity to firm-level variables.  Francis, Khurana, and Pereira (2005) estimate a firm’s implied 4 
cost of equity using the Easton (2004) methodology.  They examine the relation between a firm’s 
cost of equity and its voluntary disclosure levels, which is measured as the difference between 
the firm’s CIFAR score (a measure of disclosure in the firm’s annual reports) and the minimum 
CIFAR score in the firm’s country.  Unfortunately, the authors only have CIFAR scores for the 
1991 and 1993 fiscal years, and their sample contains only 274 firms.  Nonetheless, they find 
that “firms in industries with greater external financing needs have higher voluntary disclosure 
levels, and that an expanded disclosure policy for these firms leads to a lower cost of both debt 
and equity capital.”  A second paper by Hail and Leuz (2006b) studies the impact of a U.S. 
cross-listing on foreign firms’ cost of equity.  They find that cross-listing on a U.S. exchange is 
associated with an economically significant decrease in the cost of equity, and that this decrease 
is more pronounced in firms from countries with weaker legal institutions.   
2.2. Cost of Equity Estimates derived from Stock Index Data: 
Studies in this category measure the country’s cost of equity by applying the Gordon 
dividend growth model to data from the country’s major stock index.  Under the Gordon model, 
the country cost of equity is calculated as the sum of the stock index’s dividend yield and the 
growth rate in its dividends, which is typically measured using the index’s historical dividend 
growth rate.  Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) look at a specific security law across 103 countries, 
namely, insider trading.  After controlling for several other variables, they show that a country’s 
cost of equity, measured using stock index data, is not affected by the introduction of insider 
trading laws; however, there is a decrease in the cost of equity after the first prosecution of 
insider trading.  Unfortunately, most developed countries examined here have had their first 
insider trading prosecution prior to the beginning of the sample period, so this variable is not 
used in the analysis.  For example, they identify Canada’s first insider trading prosecution as 
occurring in 1976.  
Other studies using stock index data have also found that the country cost of equity  estimate 
decreases with both increased disclosure and better quality disclosure. For example, 
Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2003) measure a country cost of equity using stock index data 
and find a positive relation between earnings opacity and implied cost of equity, showing that 
countries with poorer disclosure have a higher cost of equity.  Daouk, Lee, and Ng (2006) 
construct a capital market governance variable for each country that incorporates the 5 
enforcement of insider trading laws, earnings opacity, and short-selling restrictions within that 
country.  They estimate the cost of equity for 22 different countries  using stock index data and 
conclude that improvements in capital market governance are associated with an economically 
significant decrease in the cost of equity after controlling for other factors. 
2.3. Summary of Previous Studies: 
In most of these previous studies, the explanatory variables of interest are either discrete or 
dummy variables.  Canada’s enforcement index scores are, in several cases, the highest of all the 
countries in their analysis, which is contrary to the perception by some that Canada has 
difficulties in its prosecution of insider trading.
2   Hail and Leuz (2006a) find that higher levels 
of these scores are related to a lower cost of equity, but since Canada is the highest of all 
countries in several of these scores, there may be little room for improving cost of equity in 
Canada by improving this score.  Another concern is that the theory underlying the measurement 
of the implied cost of equity measures has assumed U.S. accounting rules and standards.  Chen, 
Jorgensen, and Yoo (2004) question whether these assumptions are valid in an international 
context.  Specifically, implied cost of equity estimates derived from Residual Income Valuation 
Models (RIV) assume the clean surplus accounting relation.  The authors examine seven 
developed countries and show that the European countries in their sample have more of a “dirty 
surplus” relation.  Moreover, they find that RIV models underperform other implied cost of 
equity measures in European countries, while the opposite holds true for the United States, 
Canada, Australia, and Japan.  This suggests that accounting rules could have an impact on the 
level of cost of equity across countries, so I include variables to account for some of these 
differences. 
Few of the international studies on the implied cost of equity provide country cost of equity 
estimates and, moreover, the cost of equity estimates by country vary across studies, given that 
these studies cover a different time period, include a different sample of firms in their analysis, 
and calculate the cost of equity using different methods and in different currencies (i.e., local 
currency vs. a USD basis).  The implied cost of equity estimates from three prior studies are 
displayed in Figure 1 and the only definitive conclusion across countries is that Japan has either 
                                                 
2 For example, Bhattacharya comments that “Canada is a first-world country with second-world capital markets and 
third-world enforcement.”  Source: “Ontario Securities Commission Pathetic Expert Say”,  Toronto Star, December 
1, 2007. 6 
the lowest or second lowest cost of equity in all three studies.  The study by Daouk, Lee, and Ng, 
which examines the longest time period, has a large variation in cost of equity across countries 
(ranging from 5.4% to 14.2%).  Their study estimates the cost of equity using stock index data, 
which is heavily weighted to the largest firms in each country, and uses the Gordon Dividend 
Growth Model, which is very dependent on the estimate of the long-term growth rate in 
dividends.   
Aside from Japan, the country cost of equity estimates for the other two studies, which use 
firm-level data to generate the country cost of equity, are relatively close with most estimates in 
the 10-11% range; however, one cannot determine from the data provided whether these country 
estimates are statistically different from one another.  Moreover, the  intent of these studies was 
not to determine whether there are cost of equity differences across countries – these cost of 
equity estimates are just a summary of the data in each of the studies.  Therefore, the estimates 
available in these current studies should not be used to compare across countries since they do 
not account for differences in firm or country characteristics.   
2.4. Contribution to the literature: 
This paper makes three contributions to this literature.  First, I include additional firm-level 
variables and use a Fixed Effects analysis to examine the impact of these variables on the cost of 
equity at a firm level, and I examine how the relation between the implied cost of equity and 
these firm-level variables differ across countries.  Previous studies either use a country-level 
panel dataset
3, or use a firm-level dataset within the United States.  The benefit of this study is 
that it takes advantage of within country and within firm variation in the variables to estimate 
their relation with the cost of equity.   
I include additional firm-level variables to account for differences in accounting frameworks 
across firms (e.g., Historical Cost Accounting vs. Modified Historical Cost and IASB vs. Home 
country Accounting Standards) and differences in analyst optimism (e.g., analysts are more 
optimistic for firms that are not profitable).   Also, Bhattacharrya, Daouk, and Welker (2003) 
suggest that “... future research could develop techniques to assess earnings opacity at the 
                                                 
3 For example, Hail and Leuz (2006a) measure a country’s cost of equity as the median of the firm-level cost of 
equity in each year, then regress this country cost of equity on the (country-year)  median of other firm-level 
variables, as well as several country-level institutional variables. 7 
individual firm level, and then test for links between earnings opacity and equity market 
variables at the firm level rather than at the country level.”  I do so by including Analyst Forecast 
Inaccuracy as a proxy for firm-level earnings opacity [See Hope (2003)] and find that firms’ cost 
of equity is higher when this proxy for earnings opacity is higher.   
Second, I measure country-level effects on the cost of equity after controlling for firm-level 
and country-level factors that may affect the cost of equity.  Moreover, I measure the cost of 
equity in two different ways for comparability: 1) in USD and 2) in real instead of nominal 
terms. In doing so, I can compare the cost of equity across countries and get a sense of the 
precision of the country-level cost of equity estimates (i.e., whether country-level cost of equity 
estimates are statistically different from one another).
4   
Third, this paper adds to this literature by including investor protection indices reflecting 
investor protection against self-dealing by corporate insiders [World Bank (2008), Djankov et al 
(2008)] and by only focusing on developed countries in order to eliminate the influence that 
developing countries may have on the results. These indices measure the extent of disclosure, 
extent of director liability, and ease of shareholder suits in each country.  The authors report: 
“This theoretically-grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally 
works better than the commonly used index of anti-director rights [by La Porta et al (1997)].”
 5  
Canada is not the best performing country according to these indices, which makes it easier to 
argue that improvements can be made to the cost of equity in Canada, and better reflects the 
widely-held belief of problems in enforcement in Canada.
6  Moreover, I purposefully focus on 
developed countries only, since the effects of regulation on the cost of equity in previous papers 
may be driven by the developing countries.  Therefore, I can better determine the strength of the 
relation between the cost of equity and regulation in developed countries.   
                                                 
4 However, the standard errors of these country-level cost of equity estimates are probably larger than reported in 
this paper given that there could be measurement error at the country-level (i.e., in exchange rate and inflation 
forecasts) that is not accounted for. 
5 Some authors have identified problems in the ADRI index. For example, Spamann (2006) finds inconsistencies in 
the La porta et al Index.  He re-codes La Porta et al’s (1998)  Anti-Director Rights Index (ADRI) to be consistent 
across countries using the same definitions and finds that the ADRI is unlikely to be a valid measure of shareholder 
protection. 
6 David Dodge, in his speech to the Economic Club of Toronto on Improving Financial System Efficiency: The Need 
for Action, suggests  “... there still is a perception, both in Canada and abroad, that Canadian authorities aren't 
consistent in their efforts to enforce the rules against insider trading and other offences, nor tough enough in rooting 
out and punishing fraud.”,  December 11, 2006. 8 
3. Data 
I estimate the implied cost of equity for individual firms in 19 countries over each year of 
the sample (1991-2006) using firm-level data. The implied cost of equity in this paper is 
calculated as the average of four implied cost of equity models, each based on the dividend 
discount model: r_ct [Claus and Thomas (2001)]; r_lns [Lee, Ng, and Swaminathan (2004)]; r_oj 
[Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2000)]; and r_mpeg [Easton (2004)].   For details on the 
calculations underlying each of these models, please see the appendix.  For a more detailed 
discussion, the reader is referred to Witmer and Zorn (2007).   
3.1. Data Required for Cost of Equity Measures: 
This study focuses on firms from developed OECD countries (GNP per capita greater than 
$20,000) which have at least 100 firm-year observations on the cost of equity.  My sample 
covers OECD nonfinancial firms covered by I/B/E/S and Compustat over the period 1991-2006.  
The two datasets are merged together using company names, and I use the I/B/E/S forecast that 
is made six months before the fiscal year-end since the prior-year earnings results should be 
available by this time.  COMPUSTAT data is for the year ending prior to the date of the I/B/E/S 
forecast.   Also, firm-level data for a country are excluded if the cost of equity cannot be 
calculated for a minimum of 10% of the firms within that country, within that year.
7  This is to 
ensure that the observations represent a broad enough cross-section of firms within that country, 
and to minimize forecast bias which may arise when analysts cover only the top firms within a 
country.  However, even after applying this filter, analyst coverage bias will still exist to the 
extent that analysts systematically cover firms that have higher quality information 
environments
8 or firms that they feel have favorable future performance [e.g., McNichols and 
O’Brien (1997)].  After applying this filter, I have data for firms from the 19 countries listed in 
Table 1. 
                                                 
7 This screen mostly eliminates Japanese firms in the early 1990s, when I measure a cost of equity for only about 5% 
of Japanese firms in the COMPUSTAT sample. 
8 For example, Boubaker and Labegorre (2007) examine French-listed firms and find lower coverage among firms 
that are managed by a controlling family member.  However, they also show that analysts are more likely to cover 
firms owned through pyramid structures or have shares with different voting rights relative to cash flow rights, 
suggesting that analyst coverage may be in demand when there is a higher likelihood of expropriation.  For a more 
detailed discussion of analyst coverage bias and its potentail effect on the cost of equity, see Witmer and Zorn 
(2007) 9 
The implied cost of equity is calculated using the following variables: current share price 
(P0); one-year and two-year ahead earnings per share forecasts converted to U.S.D. (e1 and e2); 
payout ratio (d/e); book value per share (bv0); and the long-term growth rate in earnings per 
share (gL). 
The current share price and the median earnings per share forecasts (in local currency) are 
from I/B/E/S, and are converted into U.S.D. by assuming a random walk so that future earnings 
forecasts in U.S.D. are calculated by multiplying local currency forecasts by the current 
exchange rate.  This is also robust to different conversion methods [See Witmer and Zorn 
(2007)].   Each firm’s book value of equity is taken from Compustat and is converted to a per 
share figure by dividing by the number of shares from I/B/E/S.  The payout ratio, also from 
Compustat, is the average historic payout ratio over the previous three year period,
9  restricted to 
be between zero and one; otherwise, it is treated as missing.  The firm’s future payout ratio is 
assumed to equal the firm’s average payout ratio over the prior three years.  If the firm’s payout 
ratio is missing for each of the prior three years, the future payout ratio is assumed to equal the 
country’s mean payout ratio in that year.  As in Claus and Thomas (2001) and Hail and Leuz 
(2006a, 2006b), I set the long-term growth rate in earnings per share to the expected inflation 
rate.  Since I am meausuring a cost of equity in U.S.D., I use the U.S. expected inflation rate, 
taken from the IFO World Economic Survey (through Datastream), which quarterly polls 
economic experts about the expected future development of inflation.  
3.2. Data Required for Control Variables: 
In the regression analysis, I include several variables to account for differences in the 
characteristics of firms across countries, including firm size and leverage.  As well, I also 
examine a set of variables that attempt to control for differences in analyst forecast properties 
across countries since they could bias the calculated cost of equity estimates if they themselves 
are biased.  Therefore, in addition to year and industry dummy variables
10 (seven industry 
groupings based on 2 digit SIC codes), the following variables are included: 
                                                 
9The payout ratio is calculated as dividends ÷ earnings per share. Dividends are Compustat Data#26 and earnings 
per share are Compustat Data#58. If dividends are missing, I assume that the firm pays $0 in dividends in that year.  
10 Year dummy variables are included to control for time effects in the implied cost of capital, as well as changes in 
analyst coverage of firms through time.  For example, there is a large increase in analyst coverage in the late 1990s 
around the dot-com boom. 10 
Firm Size: A larger firm size should be associated with a lower cost of equity.  It is well-
documented that larger firms tend to have lower expected returns [Fama and French (1993), 
Banz (1981)], which could be due to the fact that larger firms are generally more liquid and tend 
to be more transparent and have a greater analyst following.  Firm size is measured as the 
logarithm of the firm’s book value of total assets (Compustat Data#89).  
Financial Leverage: Greater financial leverage should be associated with a higher cost of 
equity.
 11  Financial leverage is measured using the firm’s debt/equity ratio (Compustat 
Data#106/Compustat Data#135).
12  The cost of equity of a levered firm should be higher than the 
cost of equity of an unlevered firm and be increasing in the firm’s debt/equity ratio. 
  Forecast Dispersion: Greater forecast dispersion should be associated with a higher 
cost of equity.  In this study, the cross-sectional standard deviation of analysts’ earnings per 
share estimates (from I/B/E/S), scaled by book value per share, is used as a proxy for firm-level 
earnings variability [Gebhart, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001)].  However, forecast dispersion may 
also capture effects related to the quality of the firm’s information environment [Lang and 
Lundholm (1996)]. 
Forecast Inaccuracy: Greater forecast inaccuracy should be associated with a higher cost 
of equity.  Several studies have found that increased, better quality disclosure is associated with a 
lower cost of equity.
13   In this study, the absolute value of the previous year’s forecast error 
(expected earnings per share minus actual earnings per share), scaled by book value per share, is 
used as a proxy for disclosure, with a lower forecast inaccuracy representing better firm-level 
disclosure.  This measure of disclosure is motivated by the results in Hope (2003), Basu, Hwang, 
and Jan (1998), and Khanna, Palepu, and Chang (2000) who find that forecast accuracy is 
positively related to firm-level disclosures.
14 
                                                 
11 See Modigliani and Miller (1958). 
12 To eliminate the impact of outliers, we exclude observations above the 99
th percentile for the following variables: 
Debt/Equity Ratio, Forecasted Growth Rate (gS), and Forecast Dispersion. 
13 For theoretical work, see Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2006).  Empirical studies examining the relation 
between disclosure and the cost of equity include those by Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2002); Botosan 
(1997); Botosan and Plumlee (2003); Berger, Chen and Li (2006); Chua, Eun, Lai (2006); Hail and Leuz (2006a), 
Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), Gietzmann and Ireland (2005), and Gode and Mohanram (2003). 
14 However, studies by Lang and Lundholm (1996), Adrem (1999), and Eng and Teo (2000) find no statistical 
relation between forecast accuracy and disclosure. 11 
Current Loss Dummy variable: Firms experiencing losses should be associated with a 
higher calculated cost of equity.  Ang and Ciccone (2001) examine analyst forecast properties 
across 42 countries and find that firms with losses are associated with higher forecast error and 
forecast optimism across all countries.  Earnings estimates for firms with losses exceed ex-post 
actual earnings 87% of the time on average, while earnings estimates for firms with profits 
exceed ex-post actual earnings 52% of the time on average.  This should generate a higher future 
earnings yield if the stock price does not reflect this optimism of analysts; that is, the stock price 
reflects investors’ expectations and investors adjust analysts’ expectations of future earnings to 
account for this optimism.  All else equal, a higher level of optimism for these firms will result in 
a higher calculated cost of equity given the positive relation between the implied cost of equity 
and future earnings yields and growth. The loss dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the latest 
fiscal year’s earnings (Compustat Data#32) are negative. 
Forecast Bias:  Countries with higher analyst forecast bias may have more biased 
forecasts, which would result in a higher calculated implied cost of equity.  I t  i s  w e l l -
documented that analysts typically are biased [McNichols and O’Brien (1997), O’Brien, 
McNichols, and Lin (2005)] and that this bias could be different across countries [Ang and 
Ciccone (2001)].  Given the positive relation between the implied cost of equity and future 
earnings and growth, a positive bias in earnings forecasts would result in a positive implied cost 
of equity bias [e.g., Hail and Leuz (2006a)].  In each country-year, the aggregate forecast bias is 
measured as the previous year’s median firm forecast error (expected earnings per share minus 
actual earnings per share), scaled by book value per share.  Although similar in construction, 
there is only a small positive correlation between this measure and Forecast Inaccuracy. 
Accounting Dummy variables:  Differences in accounting methods may also have an 
impact on the calculated cost of equity. Given that the implied cost of equity measures are 
calculated using estimates of accounting earnings, differences in accounting methods may have 
an impact on the cost of equity calculation.  That is, firms using accounting methods that are 
more unconditionally conservative would, all else equal, have a lower calculated implied cost of 
equity.  Two different accounting dummy variables are used. The first dummy variable, 
ACCOUNTING, takes the value of 1 if the firm uses historical cost based accounting 12 
(Compustat Data Item AMTHD = H).  The second variable, IASB, is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the firm uses International Accounting Standards. 
These variables are meant to control for, as best as possible, differences in firm and 
institutional characteristics across countries.  However, even after controlling for the above 
variables, differences in accounting, or in analyst forecast properties, may still not be fully 
accounted for.  Therefore, the country-level effects examined later can be interpreted, or 
explained, as measuring these differences, as well as differences in corporate governance, legal 
environments, currency risk, stock market segmentation, or other factors not included in this 
analysis.  
3.3. Description of Data: 
Table 1 provides a summary for each of the control variables for the 19 countries in the 
dataset.  The United States accounts for over half of the firm-year observations, while Canada, 
France, Germany, Great Britain, Australia, Netherlands, and Japan are the only other countries 
with at least 1000 observations. Since the sample firms are selected as a function of analyst 
coverage and data availability, these sample statistics may not represent actual differences in the 
population of firms in these countries.  However, they may be useful in explaining observed 
differences in the sample country-level cost of equity.  Nonetheless, Japan, Italy, Spain, 
Switzerland, and the United States have the highest median firm size, all with a book value of 
total assets over $500M.  The median British firm is much smaller at about $275M in total 
assets.  The median firm size in most other countries lies somewhere in this range with Canada 
being almost directly in the middle.   
Most countries have a relatively small median firm leverage.  New Zealand’s median Debt/ 
Equity ratio of .48 is the highest of all countries in the sample.  There is considerable variation in 
the median Forecast Dispersion across countries.  The U.S. exhibits the lowest median Forecast 
Dispersion of .005, while other countries, like Norway, have a Forecast Dispersion that is five 
times this magnitude.  The median Canadian firm has a Forecast Dispersion measure that is just 
over twice that of the United States.  The table also displays the median Forecast Inaccuracy for 
each country in the sample.  Again, the United States is lowest on this measure, whereas other 
countries, such as Sweden and Finland, have a high Analyst Forecast Inaccuracy. Canada’ 
Forecast Inaccuracy lies between these extremes. 13 
Figure 2 examines the median cost of equity by country for my sample of firms before 
accounting for any firm-level or country-level factors.  At a top-level, it is in-line with previous 
studies, showing that Japan has the lowest cost of equity.  The cost of equity for Canada is higher 
than in other developed countries like the United States, France, Germany and Great Britain, but 
is lower than in many Scandinavian countries.  These differences could be due to institutional 
differences across countries as well as differences in the attributes of the sample of firms in each 
country.   
As a first cut, Figure 3a plots the median country-year cost of equity against median 
country-year Forecast Dispersion and it appears that there is a strong positive association 
between these two variables.  That is, countries with higher forecast dispersion, or disagreement 
amongst analysts, also have a higher cost of equity.  Figure 3b repeats this analysis with cost of 
equity plotted against median firm size, and shows a negative relation between these variables, as 
expected.  In Figure 3c, there is a positive relation between ten year yields and the cost of equity, 
although the slope of the line is less steep then expected (i.e., there is not a one-for-one increase 
in the cost of equity with an increase in ten year yields). 
4. Empirical Analysis 
Cost of equity differences across countries are estimated using a firm-level fixed effects 
panel regression model that controls for: firm size, as measured by the logarithm of book value 
of assets (BVA); financial leverage (LEV);  a loss indicator dummy variable (LOSS); analyst 
forecast dispersion (DISP); analyst forecast bias (FBIAS), analyst forecast inaccuracy 
(FINACCURACY), an accounting standards indicator dummy (IASB); a time trend (t), as well 
as business cycle effects by including year (YEAR) dummy variables.  For this regression 
analysis, a Hausman (1978) test suggests that the Fixed Effects model is preferable to a Random 
Effects.  The model standard errors are clustered by firm and the full model is written below: 
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Since the fixed effects regression eliminates any time-invariant variables, in a second stage, 
the firm fixed effect coefficient ( i µ ˆ ) is regressed against the country (COUNTRY), industry 
(IND), and accounting method (ACCOUNTING) dummy variables, as well as the firm averages 
of the time-varying independent variables 
15.   Basically, this extracts the average firm fixed 
effect by country, after controlling for industry and accounting differences. The averages of the 
time-varying independent variables are included to control for correlation between these 
variables and the firm fixed effects.
16  The country group dummy variables indicate the 
company’s country of incorporation (from COMPUSTAT).  Countries with a small number of 
observations are grouped together or with similar larger countries, given that there is limited 
statistical power to find evidence of statistical significance in countries with few observations.  
Therefore, from the nineteen countries, there are eight country group dummy variables: USA, 
JAPAN, GREAT BRITAIN and IRELAND, NORDIC countries, AUSTRALIA and NEW 
ZEALAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, and OTHER EUROPEAN.
17  There is no country dummy 
variable for Canada since it will be used as the basis for comparison
18:  
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15 This is based on the Krishnakumar (2003) model.  The coefficients and their standard errors for the time-invariant 
variables are identical to those from a between effects regression.  I use weighted least squares in this second stage 
regression to account for unbalanced panels.  However, OLS is also consistent and yields similar results. 
16 There are different methods for estimating time-invariant models in a panel setting that make different 
assumptions about the error structure in the panel dataset.  One such method for extracting time-invariant variables 
from a fixed effects regression does not use the averages of the time invariant variables in the second stage [e.g., 
Polacheck and Kim (1994), Oaxaca and Geisler (2003)]. Results excluding these time-invariant variables yield 
slightly larger differences between Canada and other countries such as the United States.  Oaxaca and Geisler (2003) 
show that using a GLS estimation procedure in the second stage yields results identical to pooled OLS for the time-
invariant variables. Other regression methods, such as Pooled OLS, will be presented later in the paper.   
17 NORDIC countries include Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark.  OTHER EUROPEAN includes Austria, 
Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland.  From here on, these country group dummy variables will 
simply be referred to as country dummy variables. 
18 Later, these country-level variables will be replaced with country-level indices that measure factors such as 
investor protection in each country. 15 
The results from the Fixed Effects regression are displayed in Table 2, Panel A, and the 
second stage regression results are displayed in Panel B.  The first model in Table 2 regresses the 
cost of equity on firm size and leverage, and includes industry, year, and country dummy 
variables as well as a time trend. The coefficients on firm size and leverage are both significant 
and have the expected sign. The overall cost of equity has declined over the sample period by 
about 14 bps a year, as indicated by the time trend variable.  In Panel B, a number of the 
coefficients on the country dummy variables are statistically significant.  Specifically, the United 
States, France,  and Japan both have a cost of equity that is lower than in Canada, while 
Australia, New Zealand, Germany, and Nordic countries have a cost of equity that is higher than 
in Canada.   The coefficient on the USA dummy variable indicates a cost of equity in the United 
States that is about 40 bps lower than in Canada, which is in line with previous results [Hail and 
Leuz (2006a); Witmer and Zorn (2007)].  In Model (1) Japan’s cost of equity is about 95 bps 
lower than in Canada.  As Figure 1 shows, most studies typically find that Japan has a much 
lower cost of equity than in other countries.  Differences in inflation and in government bond 
yields may explain part of this difference, which will be examined later.  However, this 
difference could also be due to differences in accounting or in analyst forecast bias, especially 
given the fact that the analyst forecasting environment is very different in Japan in that 
management also provides earnings forecasts for most firms [Kato, Skinner, and Kunimura 
(2006)]. 
In Model (2), Analyst Forecast Dispersion is added to the regression and it has a large, 
positive effect on the cost of equity for firms.  The effect of the size variable is less pronounced 
(and is not statistically significant), given that larger firms tend to have lower Forecast 
Dispersion. This variable has a minor impact on the coefficients of the country dummy variables.  
In Model (1), U.S. firms had a 41 bps lower cost of equity, while in Model (2) this difference is 
16 bps and is not statistically significant.   
Model (3) adds Analyst Forecast Inaccuracy as a proxy for firm-level disclosure and this 
variable has a statistically significant, positive impact on the cost of equity.  Analyst Forecast 
Inaccuracy may capture both voluntary and involuntary aspects of firm disclosure.  This variable 
may suffer from endogeneity in that firms may need or want to disclose more information when 
they are raising external capital, and firms that are raising external capital may be the ones that 16 
have a lower cost of equity.  Regardless, these results suggest that enabling analysts to make 
more accurate forecasts through improved disclosure regulation may contribute to a lower cost of 
equity for firms.  
The fourth model includes variables that account for differences in accounting and analyst 
forecast properties across countries.  The Loss Dummy coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that firms with losses have a cost of equity that is 163 bps above profitable 
firms.  Again, this variable is meant to control for analyst forecast optimism, given that analysts 
are overly optimistic on the future earnings of loss firms across most countries. The coefficient 
on Forecast Bias is not statistically significant.  Finally, the IASB dummy variable is positive 
and is statistically significant.  Therefore, firms using this accounting standard seem to have a 
slightly higher calculated cost of equity.  However, with the exception of the Forecast Inaccuracy 
variable, these three variables do not have much of an effect on the magnitude or significance of 
the other coefficients in this regression.  Forecast Inaccuracy changes because this variable is 
correlated with the Loss Dummy variable. 
4.1. Controlling for Risk-free Rates: 
Cross-country differences in the cost of equity can also be impacted by cross-country 
differences in risk-free rates, so the above analysis is repeated to account for differences in risk-
free rates across countries.  For this analysis, instead of converting cash flows to U.S. dollars to 
calculate a U.S.D. cost of equity, a real cost of equity is calculated.  First, forecasted local 
currency earnings per share are converted into real terms by deflating by the expected inflation 
rate (from the IFO World Economic Survey) in each country.  Then, a real cost of equity is 
calculated, assuming zero percent long-term growth in real earnings per share.
19   
Some studies equate the equity risk premium with the real cost of equity [e.g., Jorion and 
Goetzmann (2000)], so in this sense the real cost of equity here may be closely related to the 
equity risk premium.  However, I also include local country government Real Ten Year Yields as 
an explanatory variable, which are measured by subtracting the expected inflation in local 
currency from the nominal ten year yields.  The coefficient on the Real Ten Year Yield variable 
                                                 
19 This is consistent with earlier calculations of a nominal USD cost of equity, which assumed long-term growth as 
the rate of US inflation.  Results are similar if a nominal cost of equity is calculated in local currency (assuming 
long-term growth equals expected inflation in that country), and then converting it into a real cost of equity by 
subtracting expected inflation. 17 
is positive and statistically significant.  However, its coefficient is only about 0.2 to .25, much 
smaller than one.  This could be the case if the cost of equity estimates are noisy, if the equity 
risk premium is not constant, or if underlying government bond yields themselves contain a 
time-varying risk premium.   
The other results here are broadly similar to what was reported earlier, given that the 
coefficients on the control variables have only changed slightly.   Although the time trend is still 
negative and statistically significant, its coefficient is about one-third the size of the time trend 
coefficients examined Table 2, suggesting that most of the decline in the nominal cost of equity 
can be attributed to declining government yields and inflation.  After including government 
yields, the Japan country dummy is much less negative.  In all models examined in Table 3, the 
U.S. dummy variable is statistically significant and negative, so that U.S. firms have a lower cost 
of equity than that of Canadian firms.  
4.2. Examining country-level Regulation Variables: 
Previous studies have concentrated on relating the cost of equity to country-level variables 
reflecting different aspects of regulation and disclosure across developed and developing 
countries.  As discussed earlier, the effects found in these papers may be driven by large 
differences between developed and developing countries, in which case it may be difficult to 
relate it to the regulation in developed countries.  Moreover, Canada is the best performing 
country along many measures used in these studies, which makes it difficult to prescribe 
enhanced regulatory measures to improve the cost of equity in Canada, and may not reflect the 
widely-held belief of problems in enforcement in Canada.  This paper adds to this literature by 
including different measures reflecting investor protection against self-dealing by corporate 
insiders [Djankov et al (2008)] and by only focusing on developed countries in order to eliminate 
the influence that developing countries may have on the results. 
I use the World Bank’s (2008) Investor Protection Indices, which are adapted from Djankov 
et al (2008).  These indices are based on a hypothetical transaction between two companies in 
which the owner has controlling stakes, and measures the extent of disclosure, extent of director 
liability, and ease of shareholder suits in relation to the transaction.  Each of these indices is 
measured on a scale of 0 to 10 (with 10 representing more disclosure, more director liability, or 
more ability for shareholders to sue), and are also averaged to develop an overall Investor 18 
Protection Index.  On the overall Investor Protection Index, Canada scores an 8.3 whereas the 
maximum score among our sample of countries is 9.7.  On the Disclosure Index, Canada scores 
an 8 while other countries (such as Great Britain France, and New Zealand) score 10, so there is 
room for Canada to improve on this measure.  Similarly, Canada scores an 8 on the Shareholder 
Lawsuits Index, whereas the maximum score for our sample of countries on this score is 10.  As 
a first cut, Figure 4 shows the relation between the country median cost of equity and the 
Investor Protection Index.  Overall, there seems to be a slight negative relation between this 
index and the real cost of equity.  However, there are some outliers, which could be due to firm 
characteristics or other factors affecting the country median cost of equity.   
Therefore, I test whether countries that score higher on these measures have a lower cost of 
equity.  To do so, I repeat the two stage Fixed Effects regression from earlier.  In the first stage, I 
run the same regression as in the last column in Table 3, Panel A.  Then, in a second stage 
regression, I regress the firm Fixed Effects on the Investor Protection Measures as well as 
industry and accounting controls and the firm averages of the time-varying independent 
variables: 
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The results for four regressions (one on each of the individual Indices) are presented in 
Table 4.  All of the coefficients on the Indices are negative and statistically significant indicating 
more extensive investor protection measures are associated with a lower cost of equity.  The 
Investor Protection measure, for instance, shows a 12 bps drop in the cost of equity associated 
with each unit increase in this measure.  If Canada were to increase its performance along this 
index to match the top-performing country along this measure, it could represent a potential 
decrease of about 20 bps in the cost of equity. 
5. Robustness Tests 19 
I perform three different sets of robustness checks.  First, I run fixed effects within each 
country to examine how the relation between the cost of equity and the firm-level variables differ 
across countries.  Some variables, such as leverage, the loss dummy, and forecast dispersion, are 
relatively consistent in the sign and statistical significance level of their coefficients across 
countries.  However, there are some differences in the relation between the cost of equity and 
other firm-level variables across countries. Second, I estimate the country dummy variables 
using different econometric methods for dealing with time-invariant variables within a dataset.  
The country dummy variables in these models are similar in magnitude and / or statistical 
significance in a majority of these other models, so their results appear to be relatively robust to 
different econometric specifications.   Third, I check the sensitivity of the effect of the country 
level institutional variables on the cost of equity by performing regressions using the country-
year medians of all variables, instead of performing the analysis at a firm level, and the results 
are similar to what was reported earlier. 
5.1. Country Level Fixed Effects Regressions: 
The panel regression setup used up to this point has assumed common coefficients across all 
countries.  This may particularly be a problem given that U.S. firms comprise more than half of 
the sample.  To verify whether coefficients may vary across countries, I run fixed effects 
regressions within each of the country groups using the real cost of equity measure.   Although 
this does not formally test whether coefficients are significantly different from each other, it does 
determine whether the coefficients have the correct sign within each country.
20  
For Canada, all of the coefficients have the same sign as the fixed effects regressions with 
countries pooled together (See Table 5).  The forecast dispersion effect is much weaker in 
Canada than in the pooled regressions.  The coefficient on firm financial leverage is positive 
across all country groupings, and is statistically significant in five of the nine groups.  The same 
holds for the forecast dispersion coefficient: it is positive in all but one country and statistically 
significant in five of the nine countries. Size is only negative and statistically significant in the 
United States and Canada and has a negative coefficient in only four of the nine groupings.  It is 
positive and significant in four country groups.  However, this effect may be attributable to a 
                                                 
20 Most coefficients are statistically different from each other across countries when using a single equation and 
interacting the country coefficients with each of the variables. 20 
smaller sample size, as well as correlations between size and other variables such as forecast 
dispersion.
21  The Real 10Yr Government Yields coefficient for Canada is 0.195, similar to the 
result with all countries pooled together.  This coefficient is positive in eight of the nine groups, 
being statistically significant in seven of the groups.   
5.2. Other Econometric Methods: 
A number of econometric methods have been used in the literature to measure the impact of 
time invariant variables (e.g., the country dummy variables) in a panel setting.  These methods 
make different assumptions about the structure of the regression error terms (and in particular the 
relation between the unobservable firm fixed effects and the other explanatory variables).  I test 
two other econometric methods that can be used to measure the effects of time invariant 
variables in a panel setting: 1) Fama-Mcbeth (1973) regressions, and 2) Pooled OLS regressions.  
5.2.1. Fama-Mcbeth Regressions: 
I run Fama-Mcbeth regressions, which produce unbiased standard errors in the presence of a 
time effect, although the inclusion of year dummy variables in the earlier analysis may also 
adjust properly for a time effect [Petersen (2007)].  In the Fama Macbeth (1973) approach, I first 
run 15 cross-sectional regressions, one for each year in the sample: 
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21 Also, in a random effects estimation the size coefficient is negative across all countries, consistent with larger 
firms having a lower cost of equity. 21 
The Fama-Mcbeth results are reported in the third column of Table 6.  With the exception of 
Forecast Bias, all of the coefficients on the control variables have the expected sign and four are 
statistically significant.  As well, most are similar in magnitude to the results from random 
effects and fixed effects estimation.  However, the coefficient on the Real 10Yr Government 
Yield is 0.21 in the Fixed Effects estimation, and is 0.09 (and not statistically significant) in the 
Fama-Mcbeth estimation.  This indicates that, over time, an increase in the firm’s local Real 
10Yr Government Yield by 100 bps would be associated with an increase in its real cost of 
equity of 21 bps.  Conversely, in the cross-section, the relation between Real 10Yr Government 
Yields and the cost of equity is weaker. 
In the Fama-Mcbeth set-up, the standard errors of the country dummy variables are much 
higher.  This may be partially due to the fact that the sample of firms within each country is 
changing over time, and so that years when there is a small sample of firms within a country are 
given the same weight as years when there is a much larger sample.  This impacts the country 
coefficients because when analyst coverage is less broad, it is likely that they focus on the better 
firms that have a lower cost of equity.  Therefore, the Fama-Mcbeth (2003) estimates may 
exacerbate the analyst coverage bias, and produce less reliable results relative to the other 
methods.  Also, country dummy variable standard errors are larger due to changing sample 
composition and only two country dummy coefficients are statistically significant: the USA 
dummy coefficient and the Japan dummy coefficient.  Notwithstanding the above, these two 
estimates provide some validation to the USA and Japan coefficients from the Fixed Effects 
estimation since they are both similar to these earlier estimates in size and statistical significance. 
5.2.2. Pooled OLS: 
I also run a Pooled OLS analysis to examine the time invariant variables.  Oaxaca and 
Geisler (2003) show that the time invariant coefficients from Pooled OLS are identical to the 
coefficients from a two stage Fixed Effects Model, where GLS is used in the second stage to 
adjust for heteroskedasticity in the diagonal and off-diagonal elements of the variance/covariance 
matrix (I performed the earlier second stage regression using GLS to account for 
heteroskedasticity in the diagonal elements, and also included means of the time-varying 
variables).   Again, standard errors are adjusted to account for clustering by firm: 22 
t i t i YIELD t i IASB t i ACCOUNTING t i FBIAS





k i k IND i COUNTRY t i
YIELD IASB ACCOUNTING FBIAS
FINACC LOSS DISP LEV BVA
YEAR IND COUNTRY COE
, , , , ,








ε β β β β
β β β β β
β β β ω
+ + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + = ∑ ∑ ∑
= =
  (6) 
 
The results from this method are encouraging since the country-level dummy variables are 
similar to my original specification, in that these estimates are little changed (5-15 bps) and have 
similar significance to the original results. Overall, the results across the models are generally 
consistent with the earlier results in Table 3.  Across the different econometric methods, both the 
USA and Japan dummy coefficients are statistically significant and negative in all three models. 
The France coefficient is negative in all three models, with statistical significance in two models. 
Conversely, the Nordic dummy variable is positive in all models and is statistically significant in 
two of the three models.  For other countries, there is sparse evidence in favour of a statistically 
significant difference, partially because of a smaller sample size relative to the United States.   
5.3. Country Median Regressions: 
Previous studies examining the effect of country-level institutional variables on the cost of 
equity [e.g., Hail and Leuz (2006a)] argue for using country medians of all variables to eliminate 
the influence of one country (i.e., the United States) on the regression results.  Therefore, I run 
OLS regressions involving country-year medians of all variables.  As a result of using a country-
level analysis, firm-specific noise is removed and hence the r-squareds in these regressions are 
much larger, ranging from .44 to .46 (See Table 7).  However, the drawback to this approach is 
that the sample size is much smaller (N < 250), and information from the cross-sectional 
variation within countries is not utilized. 
Although the size coefficient is negative, it is not statistically significant in most models.  
However, countries with a higher level of analyst forecast dispersion have a higher cost of 
equity, as evidenced by this coefficient.  Moreover, the magnitude of this variable is more than 
two times larger than in previous regressions.  The coefficient on government yields is 
statistically significant and is similar to what was reported in previous regressions.  Forecast 
Inaccuracy, a proxy for Disclosure, has a statistically significant, positive coefficient that is much 
larger than what was reported earlier.  Again, if more extensive disclosure requirements can help 23 
earnings forecasts become more accurate, then they may also help in reducing the cost of equity.  
Models (2) through (5) include each of the individual Shareholder Protection Indices.  Three out 
of four are negative, and the Disclosure Index is statistically significant, which also shows that 
more extensive disclosure requirements are associated with a lower cost of equity. 
6. Conclusion 
From a high level, Canada’s cost of equity is slightly higher than the median of the cost of 
equity of the 19 countries examined in this paper; it is higher than in countries such as the United 
States, Japan, and Great Britain, and lower than in countries like Norway, Finland, and Sweden.   
However, these top-level cost of equity estimates are influenced by factors such as the 
characteristics of firms that analysts choose to cover in each country, differences in the 
properties of analyst forecasts across countries, and differences in accounting standards across 
these countries.  After employing a regression analysis to account for these factors, Canada’s 
cost of equity is statistically significantly different from a handful of countries.  Firms from the 
United States have a cost of equity that is about 20 to 40 bps lower than that of Canadian firms in 
most models, and lowering Canadian firm’s cost of equity by this amount would have large 
economic benefits given the size of Canada’s capital markets.  However, even after controlling 
for the above factors, differences in accounting, or in analyst forecast properties, may still not be 
fully accounted for.  Therefore, the country-level effects can be interpreted, or explained, as 
measuring these unmodeled differences, as well as differences in corporate governance, legal 
environments, currency risk, stock market segmentation, or other factors not included in this 
analysis.  
There is a statistically significant, positive relation between analyst forecast inaccuracy and 
the cost of equity.  Analyst forecast inaccuracy should be a proxy for the market’s ability to 
forecast firm-level earnings, and if improved transparency or accounting disclosure regulation 
can improve this ability, it may also result in a lower firm-level cost of equity.  
The good news is that the nominal cost of equity has declined over time by about 10 to 15 
bps per year since the beginning of the sample period.  This decline can be mostly attributed to 
the reduction in government yields and inflation, since the decline in the cost of equity is much 24 
smaller when examining the real cost of equity with real government yields as a right hand side 
variable. 25 
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Figure 1: Previous work on Cost of Equity. This graph summarizes results from 3 previous studies that 
have provided cost of equity estimates at a country level.  The Claus and Thomas (2001) study utilizes their cost of 
equity methodology, and they report the cost of equity in local currency Hail and Leuz (2006a) estimate the cost of 
equity using an average of four methods and also report results in local currency. Daouk, Lee, and Ng (2006) 









 Figure 2: Cost of Equity by Country. This graph displays the mean of the USD nominal cost of equity for 









Figure 3: Scatter Plots. These graphs plot the median nominal cost of equity (by country-year) against the 
median forecast dispersion (3a), median firm size (3b), and the median real cost of equity against real government 
yields in 3c. Squares represent observations on Canada, diamonds represent observations on Japan, and solid circles 


























Figure 4: Real Cost of Equity vs Investor Protection. This graphs plots the median real cost of equity 
(by country) against the World Bank’s (2008) Investor Protection Index, adapted from Djankov et al (2008).  This 
index is based on a hypothetical transaction between two companies in which the owner has controlling stakes, and 
measures the extent of disclosure, extent of director liability, and ease of shareholder suits in relation to the 
transaction.  Each of these indices is measured on a scale of 0 to 10 (with 10 representing more disclosure, more 
director liability, or more ability for shareholders to sue), and are averaged to develop an overall Investor Protection 
Index. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (Medians).  This table presents medians for key variables for each country in our sample. N indicates the number of 
observations, or firm-years, by country. Total Assets is calculated using book values from Compustat and is converted into USD. Leverage is the Debt/ Equity 
ratio and is also calculated using book values. Forecast dispersion is the cross-sectional standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts, scaled by book value 
per share. % Firms with Losses is the percentage of firms in each country in our sample with a cost of equity estimate who experienced losses in the previous 
fiscal year.  Forecast Bias is the country average forecast error (forecasted earnings minus predicted earnings, scaled by book value per share) in the previous 
year.  Forecast Inaccuracy is the absolute value of the analyst forecast error in the previous year.    








Forecast Bias  Forecast 
Inaccuracy 
           
AUSTRALIA  1,420  383  .38 .0096 .09  .12  .015 .029 
AUSTRIA  151  452 .32 .015 .11  .99 .013  .032 
BELGIUM  349  457 .35 .015  .1  .52 .019  .033 
CANADA  3,057 421  .37  .011  .1  1  .00026  .03 
DENMARK  526  320 .28 .011  .049 .41  -.0052  .032 
FINLAND  582  350 .34 .017  .077 .47  -.0016  .045 
FRANCE  1,929  499 .32 .014  .076 .69  .01 .027 
GERMANY  1,385  459 .17 .014 .11  1 .0095  .036 
GREAT BRITAIN  6,082  275 .22  .0086  .089 .39 .005  .037 
IRELAND  308 393  .44  .0056  .078  .19  -.0046  .028 
ITALY  501  631 .31 .017  .072 .13 .011  .033 
JAPAN  3,651  779  .22 .0064 .11  .81 .0028  .026 
NETHERLANDS  1,084  441 .31 .015  .046 .79 .013  .027 
NEW ZEALAND  216  144 .48 .011  .074 .25  -.0014  .043 
NORWAY  454  280 .45 .025 .16  .75 .027  .052 
SPAIN  544  753 .33 .015  .029 .18  .0053  .022 
SWEDEN  958 317  .3  .016  .092  .64  .0095  .044 
SWITZERLAND  768 640  .28  .012  .074  .8  -.003  .031 
USA  23,679  656 .35  .0051 .1  1 .0037  .026 
Total  47,644  532  .31 .0073  .096  .81 .0037  .029 34 
Table 2: Fixed Effects Regressions –COE, All Countries.  
 
PANEL A: This panel presents results for different specifications of the following fixed effects 
regression involving the USD nominal cost of equity (assuming a random walk exchange rate): 
t i i t i IASB
t i Y FINACCURAC t i FBIAS t i LOSS
t i DISP t i LEV t i BVA
t
i t YEAR t i
IASB
Y FINACCURAC FBIAS LOSS









β β β β α
+ + +
+ + +
+ + + + = ∑
=
 
Absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity of errors at a firm 
level (*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Assets)  -0.187 -0.012 0.039  0.010 
  (3.87)***  (0.25) (0.67) (0.18) 
Leverage  0.891 0.750 0.673 0.650 
  (18.66)*** (15.39)*** (12.28)*** (12.36)*** 
t  -0.142 -0.150 -0.125 -0.130 
  (11.33)***  (11.77)*** (9.95)*** (10.30)*** 
Forecast Dispersion    26.955 25.349 26.320 
    (13.54)*** (10.97)*** (11.51)*** 
Forecast Inaccuracy     3.091  0.436 
     (12.88)***  (1.58) 
Loss Dummy      1.633 
      (16.58)*** 
Forecast Bias      -0.571 
      (0.31) 
IASB Dummy      0.351 
      (2.80)*** 
Constant  13.842 12.387 11.460 11.687 
  (45.50)*** (38.04)*** (32.26)*** (33.34)*** 
Observations  47153 43209 37024 37024 
Number of firms  8102 7520 6829 6829 
Year  Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Overall R-squared  0.06 0.07 0.07 0.10 
Within R-squared  0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 
Between R-squared  0.05 0.07 0.06 0.10 
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PANEL B: This panel presents results for different specifications of the following second stage 
regression involving fixed firm-level effects ( i µ ˆ ) estimated in Panel A: 
i i IASB
i Y FINACCURAC i FBIAS i LOSS






k i k IND i COUNTRY i
v IASB
Y FINACCURAC FBIAS LOSS




+ + + +







γ γ γ γ









NORDIC countries include Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. OTHER EUROPEAN 
includesAustria, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland.Absolute value of z statistics are in 
parentheses (*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
USA  -0.415 -0.164 -0.229 -0.192 
  (3.93)*** (1.56)  (2.09)** (1.81)* 
JAPAN  -0.943 -1.002 -1.091 -1.179 
  (6.52)*** (6.92)*** (7.35)*** (8.12)*** 
GBR & IRELAND  0.091 -0.012 -0.171 0.083 
  (0.75) (0.10) (1.34) (0.58) 
NORDIC  0.979 0.588 0.524 0.657 
  (6.62)*** (3.93)*** (3.32)*** (4.03)*** 
AUSTRALIA & NZ  0.325 0.303 0.205 0.380 
  (1.95)* (1.83)*  (1.17) (1.98)** 
FRANCE  -0.273 -0.607 -0.640 -0.610 
  (1.70)*  (3.79)*** (3.65)*** (3.40)*** 
GERMANY  0.439 0.117 0.342 0.256 
  (2.47)**  (0.65) (1.72)* (1.22) 
OTHER EUROPEAN  0.220 -0.095 -0.033 0.070 
  (1.60) (0.69) (0.23) (0.45) 
Accounting Dummy      0.140 
      (1.42) 
Constant  3.746 4.486 4.294 3.728 
  (5.25)***  (6.45)*** (10.02)*** (8.67)*** 
Industry Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  8102 7520 6829 6829 
R-squared  0.19 0.21 0.22 0.23 
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Table 3: Fixed Effects Regressions – Real COE, All Countries.  
 
PANEL A: This panel presents results for different specifications of the following fixed effects 
regression involving the real cost of equity: 
t i i t i YIELD t i IASB
t i Y FINACCURAC t i FBIAS t i LOSS
t i DISP t i LEV t i BVA
t
i t YEAR t i
YIELD IASB
Y FINACCURAC FBIAS LOSS







ε µ β β
β β β
β β β β α
+ + + +
+ + +
+ + + + = ∑
=
 
Absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity of errors at a firm 
level (*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(Assets)  -0.100 -0.110  0.016  0.021  0.005 
  (2.59)*** (2.81)***  (0.39)  (0.46)  (0.11) 
Leverage  0.681 0.677 0.571 0.525 0.508 
  (17.33)*** (17.31)*** (14.30)*** (11.69)*** (11.64)*** 
t  -0.067 -0.038 -0.041 -0.047 -0.053 
  (6.60)*** (3.64)*** (3.81)*** (4.35)*** (4.86)*** 
Real Gov’t Yields    0.209 0.218 0.203 0.209 
    (9.72)*** (9.98)*** (8.74)*** (8.95)*** 
Forecast Dispersion     22.155  21.173  21.693 
     (13.74)***  (11.27)***  (11.65)*** 
Forecast Inaccuracy      2.161  0.518 
      (11.44)***  (2.39)** 
Loss Dummy       1.005 
       (13.55)*** 
Forecast Bias       1.051 
       (0.72) 
IASB Dummy       0.454 
       (4.39)*** 
Constant  9.931 9.123 7.959 7.909 8.007 
  (40.96)*** (34.83)*** (28.37)*** (25.28)*** (25.69)*** 
Observations  47887 46807 42875 36710 36710 
Number of firms  8198 8013 7441 6761 6761 
Year  Dummies  YES YES YES YES YES 
Overall R-squared  0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 
Within R-squared  0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 
Between R-squared  0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08 
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PANEL B: This panel presents results for different specifications of the following second stage 
regression involving fixed firm-level effects ( i µ ˆ ) estimated in Panel A: 
i i YIELD i IASB
i Y FINACCURAC i FBIAS i LOSS i






k i k IND i COUNTRY i
v YIELD IASB
Y FINACCURAC FBIAS LOSS
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Absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses (*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
USA  -0.508 -0.413 -0.250 -0.338 -0.288 
  (5.75)***  (3.36)*** (2.05)** (2.67)*** (2.31)** 
JAPAN  -0.565 -0.409 -0.434 -0.591 -0.598 
  (4.71)*** (2.17)**  (2.27)** (3.01)***  (3.05)*** 
GBR & IRELAND  -0.026 0.040 -0.042 -0.199 -0.007 
  (0.25) (0.34) (0.36) (1.61) (0.05) 
NORDIC  0.928 0.973 0.750 0.709 0.746 
  (7.47)*** (7.43)*** (5.62)*** (5.02)*** (5.05)*** 
AUSTRALIA & NZ  0.198 0.247 0.228 0.088 0.212 
  (1.40) (1.67)* (1.54)  (0.56)  (1.22) 
FRANCE  -0.112 -0.026 -0.248 -0.306 -0.303 
  (0.83)  (0.18)  (1.72)* (1.94)* (1.86)* 
GERMANY  0.360 0.406 0.212 0.441 0.310 
  (2.41)**  (2.52)** (1.29) (2.44)** (1.62) 
OTHER EUROPEAN  0.359 0.476 0.296 0.270 0.315 
  (3.10)***  (3.33)***  (2.08)** (1.79)* (1.97)** 
Accounting Dummy       0.116 
       (1.33) 
Constant  3.615 4.301 5.056 4.366 3.925 
  (6.08)*** (6.43)*** (7.69)*** (9.44)*** (8.26)*** 
Industry  Dummies  YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations  8198 8013 7441 6761 6761 
R-squared  0.21 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 
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Table 4:  Regression with Country Level Index Measures This table presents results for 
different specifications of the following second stage regression involving fixed firm-level effects ( i u ˆ ) 
estimated in Table 3, Panel A (Final Column): 
i i YIELD i IASB
i Y FINACCURAC i FBIAS i LOSS






k i k IND i INDEX IP i
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Disclosure -0.100       
 (5.78)***       
Director Liability    -0.035     
   (2.65)***     
Shareholder  Lawsuits     -0.059  
     (2.47)**   
Investor Protection        -0.117 
       (4.89)*** 
Accounting  Dummy  -0.173 0.021 -0.000 0.022 
 (2.56)**  (0.29)  (0.01)  (0.33) 
Constant  3.641 3.314 3.585 3.947 
  (9.07)*** (8.23)*** (7.97)*** (9.16)*** 
Observations  6761 6761 6761 6761 





Table 5: Fixed Effects Regressions by Country.  This table presents results for country-level fixed effects regressions involving the real cost of 
equity, and the second stage regresses the firm fixed effects on means of the time-varying variables as well as the time invariant variables.  Absolute value of t 
statistics are in parentheses and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity of errors at a firm level (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
t i i t i IASB t i Y FINACCURAC t i YIELD t i DISP t i LOSS t i LEV t i BVA t i IASB Y FINACCURAC YIELD DISP LOSS LEV BVA COE , , , , , , , , , ε µ β β β β β β β α + + + + + + + + + =  
 
  CANADA USA  GBR  & 
IRELAND 
FRANCE  GERMANY  NORDIC OTHER 
EUROPE 
JAPAN  AUSTRALIA 
& NEW 
ZEALAND 
Ln(Assets) -0.312  -0.108  0.038  0.792 1.494 0.854 1.311 -0.068  -0.196 
  (1.77)*  (2.76)***  (0.35)  (3.91)*** (3.89)*** (3.74)*** (5.87)***  (0.24)  (0.88) 
Leverage 1.007  0.539  0.336  0.116 0.411 1.003 0.209 -0.181 1.270 
  (4.16)***  (10.08)***  (2.47)**  (0.59)  (1.04) (4.09)*** (1.03)  (0.75) (3.68)*** 
Real  10Yr  Govt  Yield  0.195 0.141 -0.130 0.274 0.127 0.291 0.284 1.460 0.212 
 (3.41)***  (6.16)***  (3.22)***  (3.12)***  (0.80)  (4.49)***  (4.21)*** (12.16)*** (3.46)*** 
Forecast Dispersion  7.035  35.710  16.430  9.324 7.218  13.399  13.474 63.773 -2.203 
 (1.05)  (10.74)***  (3.91)***  (1.38)  (0.79)  (3.02)*** (2.88)*** (8.49)***  (0.30) 
Forecast Inaccuracy  0.631  0.494  0.692  2.826 1.402 0.432 0.389 -0.818 -0.219 
  (0.62)  (1.67)*  (1.27) (2.34)** (0.98)  (0.51)  (0.45)  (0.69)  (0.26) 
Loss  Dummy  0.992 1.056  0.791 1.012 1.389 1.902 1.811 0.531 0.356 
 (3.12)***  (11.03)***  (3.58)***  (2.53)**  (3.13)*** (5.28)*** (4.57)***  (2.21)**  (0.96) 
IASB  Dummy  0.000  0.000  -0.429 0.252 -0.182 -0.261 -0.102 0.000  0.081 
  (.)  (.)  (2.49)**  (0.91) (0.58) (1.29) (0.44)  (.)  (0.13) 
Constant  9.795 8.050  8.922 1.658 -1.416 2.934 -0.528 5.870 9.367 
 (7.93)***  (26.73)***  (12.06)***  (1.02)  (0.52) (1.98)** (0.34)  (2.94)***  (6.57)*** 
Observations  2223  19559 4319 1288  871  1810 2338 3077 1225 
Number  of  firms  444  2992 817 279 253 385 469 890 232 
Overall  R-squared 0.05 0.12  0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.03 
Within  R-squared  0.06 0.07  0.05 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.15 0.05 
Between R-squared  0.05 0.15  0.00 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.02 40 
Table 6: Panel Regressions – All Countries Real COE.  This table presents results using 
different econometric methods.  The first column, Fixed Effects, re-presents the results from the last 
column of the previous table (coefficients from both stages in the regression are displayed for brevity and 
comparison purposes). Absolute value of t statistics are in parentheses and are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity of errors at a firm level.  The second column presents coefficients from Fama-Mcbeth 
(1973)  regressions, which are the average of coefficients for 15 cross-sectional regressions (one for each 
year): 
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LOSS DISP LEV YIELD
BVA IND COUNTRY COE
, , , , ,







β β β β
β β β ω
+ + +
+ + + + +




Finally, the results of a Pooled OLS regression are displayed in the last column.     
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Again, standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity of errors at a firm level (*significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
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Table 6: Panel Regressions – All Countries Real COE (Continued).  
  Fixed Effects  Fama-Mcbeth  Pooled OLS 
Ln(Assets)  0.005 -0.264 -0.299 
  (0.11) (7.33)***  (18.57)*** 
Leverage  0.508 0.643 0.575 
  (11.64)*** (8.18)*** (14.49)*** 
t  -0.053  -0.069 
  (4.86)***  (6.73)*** 
Real Gov’t Yields  0.209 0.085 0.163 
  (8.95)*** (0.64) (6.69)*** 
Forecast Dispersion  21.693 27.626 23.494 
  (11.65)*** (7.03)*** (12.95)*** 
Forecast Inaccuracy  0.518 0.187 0.348 
  (2.39)** (0.83)  (1.52) 
Loss Dummy  1.005 1.547 1.442 
  (13.55)*** (17.54)*** (18.81)*** 
Forecast Bias  1.051 -2.733 -0.139 
  (0.72) (0.32) (0.09) 
IASB Dummy  0.454 -0.391 0.423 
  (4.39)*** (0.87) (3.73)*** 
Accounting Dummy  0.116 0.007 0.002 
  (1.33) (0.08) (0.02) 
USA  -0.288 -0.339 -0.232 
  (2.31)** (1.74)  (1.91)* 
JAPAN  -0.598 -0.537 -0.578 
  (3.05)*** (2.02)* (3.92)*** 
GBR & IRELAND  -0.007 -0.075 -0.016 
  (0.05) (0.41) (0.11) 
NORDIC  0.746 0.248 0.633 
  (5.05)*** (1.07) (3.78)*** 
AUSTRALIA & NZ  0.212 0.278 0.082 
  (1.22) (1.26) (0.41) 
FRANCE  -0.303 -0.060 -0.407 
  (1.86)* (0.26)  (2.43)** 
GERMANY  0.310 -0.074 0.182 
  (1.62) (0.34) (0.94) 
OTHER EUROPEAN  0.315 0.073 0.217 
  (1.97)** (0.23)  (1.34) 
Year  Dummies  YES YES YES 
Industry  Dummies  YES YES YES 







Table 7: Country Median Regressions. This table reports the results of an OLS regression of the 
country-year median real cost of equity against the country-year medians of other explanatory variables. 
Robust t statistics are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(Assets)  -0.132 -0.239 -0.125 -0.121 -0.197 
  (0.65) (1.25) (0.64) (0.56) (1.03) 
Leverage  2.274 2.470 2.426 2.209 2.614 
  (3.04)*** (2.82)** (2.57)** (2.41)** (2.79)** 
Real Gov’t Yields   0.175  0.204  0.173  0.175  0.187 
 (2.53)**  (3.20)*** (2.70)**  (2.48)**  (2.84)** 
Forecast  Dispersion  63.927 53.523 57.951 65.970 50.622 
 (2.83)**  (2.40)**  (2.56)** (2.40)** (2.26)** 
Forecast  Inaccuracy  22.082 21.304 22.704 21.894 22.674 
 (2.94)*** (2.85)**  (3.15)*** (2.89)***  (3.00)***
Loss  Dummy  1.785 2.043 1.949 1.740 2.113 
  (1.55) (1.74)*  (1.75)* (1.53) (1.92)* 
Forecast  Bias  -5.730 -4.932 -5.641 -5.691 -5.418 
  (1.13) (0.97) (1.11) (1.13) (1.05) 
Disclosure   -0.077       
   (2.08)*       
Director  Liability     -0.044    
     (0.62)    
Shareholder Lawsuits        0.014   
       (0.16)   
Investor  Protection       -0.097 
       (1.42) 
Constant  6.422 7.487 6.606 6.279 7.333 
 (5.24)*** (5.94)*** (5.61)*** (3.95)***  (5.81)***
Observations  219 219 219 219 219 
R-squared  0.44 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.45 43 
Appendix: Summary of Implied COE Calculations 
 
r_ct: Claus and Thomas (2001) implied COE is the value of r that solves: 
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− =  
Earnings growth is faded towards the long-run earnings growth and the dividend payout 
ratio is faded towards the long-run dividend payout ratio by year 16. 
 
 






























S + =  
 
Variables across all models (for COE calculation in USD): 
P0  = Current market price. 
et  = Expected future earnings per share t periods ahead.   
(In the CT and LNS model, e3 = e2* (1+gS)). 
gS  = Short-term growth rate, or (e2-e1)/ e1 
gL  = Long-term growth rate in earnings per share, using the U.S. expected 
inflation rate, taken from the IFO World Economic Survey (through 
Datastream). 
dp  = Dividend payout ratio, using the average historic payout ratio 
(dividends plus repurchases, divided by earnings) over the previous three 
years.  If unavailable, the mean country payout ratio in that year is used. 
bv0  = Current book value per share. 
 
 